and the reduction of the planet's ability to absorb waste and pollution. The magnitude of the global challenge is illustrated by what scientists have recently coined the advent of the "Anthropocene", a geological era in which human activities rival global geophysical forces in shaping the planet. 8 As the
Anthropocene unfolds and business-as-usual trends are pushing us against global planetary boundaries, the limitations of conventional top-down approaches in international governance are becoming increasingly apparent.
And as Debra Javeline has recently argued, political scientists need to consider not only how to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions but also how to reduce humanity's "vulnerability to the now inevitable impacts of climate change." 9 In response to the apparent failure of climate multilateralism, scholars have proposed several forms of innovation in global governance, from bottomup policy processes and experimentalist governance to transnational regime complexes and multi-actor governance networks. 10 Minilateralism is but one, albeit important, variant of global governance innovation. Its attraction lies not least in the fact that it works with the grain of international politics and merely seeks to modify existing processes of international cooperation. Writing in this journal, for example, Robert Keohane and Victor advocate building "parallel club-oriented regimes as part of a regime complex" rather than negotiating a "comprehensive, integrated regime." 11 By creatively reshaping the composition of international forums to better reflect global power realities, minilateralism thus promises a more realistic scenario for developing global policy responses.
If indeed an "effective architecture of governance system for planetary stewardship is likely to be polycentric and multi-level rather than centralized and hierarchical," 12 as Will Steffen et al. suggest, then political science research needs to focus on whether and how such novel governance approaches can be made to work at the global level. The debate on polycentric governance, originally developed for local and national contexts, has only begun to address this question of global effectiveness. 13 I aim to make a contribution to this debate in two ways. First, I develop a more finegrained understanding of how minilateralism is meant to promote global climate mitigation, by separating out the different theoretical rationales behind club-based solutions. Second, by subjecting each of these rationales to critical examination, I inject a greater sense of realism into the debate and identify those areas in which club-based approaches can indeed make a meaningful contribution. Using insights from international relations theories, I map out a research agenda on how to turn minilateral clubs into realistic tools for global governance innovation without falling prey to hubristic expectations.
The analysis unfolds in four steps. I first provide a brief review of the recent debate on climate minilateralism, highlighting the different models that have been put forward and identifying the functions they are intended to serve. The subsequent three sections then examine in more detail how convincing the rationales behind each minilateral model are: the notion that small-n negotiation groups are more likely to reach an international compromise on climate mitigation by improving bargaining efficiency; the idea that climate clubs can change the underlying interest structure in international climate politics by creating club benefits and enforcing club rules; and the argument that a minilateral forum can re-legitimate the multilateral climate regime by empowering the great powers while establishing their special climate responsibilities and tying the club into the multilateral framework. The final section sums up my argument and proposes an agenda for future research. I argue that, while minilateralism is unlikely to overcome the structural barriers to a comprehensive and ambitious international agreement, it can nevertheless serve certain limited purposes: climate clubs can enhance political dialogue in the context of multilateral negotiations and provide a more conducive environment for great power bargaining; they can create club benefits that strengthen mitigation strategies and reduce free-riding, but only for so-called coalitions of the willing; and they can help re-legitimate the global climate regime against the background of profound power shifts that have slowed down progress in the multilateral negotiations.
A Review of Minilateralist Proposals
A growing number of analysts have advocated a minilateral solution to the problem of climate change. Closer analysis of these proposals reveals that there are in fact not one but several different minilateral models. These models vary in important ways, with regard to questions of club size and membership, purpose and function, and legitimacy and inter-regime linkages.
As I argue in this section, these variations reflect not just minor differences in regime design but contrasting theoretial rationales for climate minilateralism.
Most minilateralist arguments take as their starting point the assumption that the unequal distribution of power is an inescapable fact of international life, and that if lasting international cooperation is to be achieved then the process of negotiating international agreements must in some way reflect this power asymmetry. This is a central point in Miles Kahler's classic definition of minilateralism as a "system of governance through great power collaboration". 14 However, it is far from obvious how club size and membership should be determined in the case of climate change. In fact, existing proposals range from twenty to just two members. Naim assumes that the number should be "about 20," which would account for between 75 percent and 80 percent of global emissions. 15 Others believe the right number is between twelve and twenty, 16 with some proposing the seventeen-strong It is clear from this brief review that the design of club size and membership is closely related to what a climate club is meant to achieve. On this question, three different types of minilateral functions can be distinguished, and it makes sense to structure our analysis around these three minilateralist rationales. The first is about enhancing political dialogue and bargaining. A minilateral forum achieves this by allowing the major emitters to discuss climate policy informally, away from official multilateral negotiations.
Such a dialogue forum would enable the political leaders of the major emitters to build mutual trust and explore how to find common ground without the expectation of reaching a formal agreement, much like in the G-8 or G-20. 32 For this, club membership would be restricted to the great powers, but could vary depending on the specific focus of the political dialogue. Alternatively, the minilateral club could be the main forum for full-scale negotiations. In order to lower the transaction costs of bargaining and reduce the severity of interest asymmetries among great powers, the number of club members would need to be kept to a minimum. 33 Naim calls this minilateralism's "magic number", or 
Bargaining Efficiency
Rationalist theories of international relations that focus on the distribution of national interests and the bargaining context in which countries pursue their interests have been at the forefront of developing minilateralist proposals. Their starting point is the widely-shared observation that UNFCCCstyle multilateralism is cumbersome, inefficient, and slow. Universal emancipation in the negotiations empowers too many countries that have no interest in a workable compromise and produces outcomes that reflect the lowest common denominator. 39 In their view, Olson's famous dictum that "the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good" sums up what is wrong with climate multilateralism.
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Creating international co-operation on emissions reductions is a costly global collective good, with not enough major powers willing to pay for its provision.
Unless the major polluters' interests change, something else-the bargaining process-has to change to improve the provision of the collective good. One conclusion that rationalists draw from this analysis is that a shift of the negotations towards a minilateral forum would improve the efficiency of the bargaining context and promote a more meaningful international agreement.
The "k-group" approach to international bargaining captures the logic of this argument. 41 Small groups of countries find it easier to reach agreements than large-n settings, mainly because fewer countries' interests and circumstances need to be taken into account, fewer bilateral and plurilateral side-deals need to be struck, and linkage politics can be used in a more 
Club Benefits
The second rationale that rationalist theories of International Relations put forward for a minilateral approach is focused on the ability of minilateral forums to change interest structures. Rather than merely altering the bargaining process, climate clubs are expected to create incentives for states to join clubs and abide by their rules. By changing the way individual countries calculate their national interest, minilateralism is expected to become a transformative institution that tackles the structural barriers to strong mitigation agreements.
Analysts of international climate politics have long argued that one of the key shortcomings of the climate regime is the absence of international mechanisms that encourage compliance and deter free riding. 46 For as long as international climate politics aims at producing a global public good in the form of coordinated emission reduction by all major emitters, the supply of such a public good will be insufficient. What is needed, therefore, is a change in the nature of international cooperation. Instead of aiming for near-universal membership in a broad mitigation agreement, climate politics needs to redefine climate protection as a quasi-private good. A minilateral club is needed to produce this shift, as it allows for the creation of club benefits that are restricted to those countries willing to abide by its rules. In theory, climate minilateralism thus offers three advantages over a multilateral approach: it allows climate leaders to go ahead with more ambitious mitigation policies without waiting for laggards to agree to the collective effort; it creates benefits from emission reductions that encourage countries to join the club, thereby enlarging the scope of the agreement over time; and it enables the club to enforce commitments as membership in the club can be suspended and benefits can be withdrawn. In this way, minilateralism seeks to change international climate politics from a lowest-common-denominator logic towards a more decentralized game of ratcheting up mitigation efforts. States, Europe, and Japan. The club nature of the GATT allowed the trade regime to create specific benefits to members that were unavailable to nonmembers, such as market access, lower tariffs, and use of a dispute settlement mechanism. In this way, club-based cooperation changed states' incentive structure to favour reciprocal trade liberalization, mainly because the GATT's exclusion mechanism turned free trade into a private good. Even if the gradual expansion of free trade through GATT rounds ended up producing side benefits for non-members and the global economy as a whole, 48 the discrete benefits to individual countries arising from GATT membership were large enough to incentivize a growing number to join the club and abide by its rules. 49 How could a similar approach be applied to climate politics? The fundamental dilemma of international climate cooperation is that the public good nature of mitigation efforts creates pervasive free-riding incentives, thereby undercutting countries' willingness to contribute to the mitigation effort. Any country trying to reduce its own emissions faces costs that it has to shoulder in the short run. However, the benefits that it produces, in the form of global climate stabilization, materialize in the long run and are nonexcludable. In the absence of a multilateral climate regime that enforces national mitigation commitments, the only way to change this incentive structure is either to reduce the national costs of climate mitigation or to turn mitigation benefits from a public into a private good, or both. Minilateralism is meant to achieve this by creating club arrangements that pool the mitigation cost among a small group of countries and create excludable club benefits from their cooperation.
The benefits of club-based international cooperation are usually based on preferential access to certain economic gains, in the form of finance, trade, investment or technology. In the case of climate change, this could involve granting club members preferential access to climate finance, e.g., through grants or loans for investments in emission-reducing technologies; it could be based on a scheme to share proprietary low-carbon technologies at no cost or at below-market rates; or it could lead to collective mitigation efforts based on sectoral agreements or regional emission trading schemes that lower the costs of mitigation. 50 Clubs may also need to impose sanctions on members to encourage compliance and deter free riding. This usually takes the form of exclusion from the club, withdrawal of certain membership rights, trade discrimination, or financial penalties. In the case of a climate club, noncompliant members could face the withdrawal of club benefits such as access to climate finance and technology sharing, or the imposition of carbon tariffs on their exports. In principle, any such benefits could be created in a large-n multilateral setting, too, but where interest diversity and free-riding incentives are high, as in climate change, the advantages of operating in a small-n environment are overwhelming: producing benefits and imposing sanctions is less costly, and bargaining over rules is less complex, if club membership is small.
How convincing is this minilateralist logic? In assessing the viability of climate clubs, it is important to consider the different ways in which they are expected to change countries' incentives. technology, but it is unrealistic to expect non-climate benefits from club cooperation to play a major role in driving global mitigation strategies.
The second club strategy for changing countries' incentives is based on the provision of financial transfers. Paying other countries to increase environmental protection is a common feature in international environmental politics. Several multilateral regimes rely on aid mechanisms to increase participation and compliance, and the UNFCCC itself uses several such funding mechanisms to promote climate mitigation and adaptation (Global Environment Facility, Adaptation Fund, Clean Development Mechanism). To be effective, such aid mechanisms depend on a high level of environmental concern among donor countries and the capacity to absorb aid and reduce environmental degradation among recipient countries. For this reason, international environmental aid has usually flown from the North to the South, and mostly to emerging economies with large populations. 57 The same has been the case with climate funding through the Clean Development Mechanism, which has benefitted primarily China, India, Brazil, South Korea, and Mexico. 58 However, climate aid flows have had a negligible effect on global emissions so far and have failed to stem the rising tide of emissions from emerging economies. Channeling such transfers through smaller clubs could provide an attractive option for better targeting aid. But it is unlikely that environmental concern will be high enough among donor countries to pay for significant mitigation efforts in the largest emitters from the Global South, which are also major economic competitors. Financial transfers may play a small role in the global mitigation effort, but the leading global emitters will have to finance the bulk of emission reductions themselves.
The third club strategy involves sanctions to reduce the risk of free riding. They can be imposed on existing members if they fail to comply with club rules or used against non-members in order to induce them to join the club. In both cases, the sanctions need to be costly enough to alter the target country's interest calculation, which usually requires trade restrictions in one form or the other. Proponents of such an approach point to the use of trade restrictions in the Montreal Protocol, which are widely held to have ensured high levels of compliance and attracted near-universal participation. 59 In his proposal for a climate club, Nordhaus discusses carbon-specific tariffs or a uniform tariff on imports from non-members as the best way for club members to ensure that others will want to join the collective mitigation effort.
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Economic calculations of the required tariff suggest that it would be within a reasonable range-Nordhaus arrives at a 2 percent universal tariff. Finally, a climate club would need to support any mitigation commitment by establishing an effective system for reporting, monitoring, and verification. This is to prevent shirking by members that claim to adhere to club rules but fail to do so in reality. This has so far eluded most existing minilateral efforts; most of the existing clubs, such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership, were unable to establish a comprehensive system of monitoring and verification. And the history of multilateral negotiations suggests that major powers are reluctant to subject themselves to strict international monitoring and verification obligations in the environmental field. This is not to suggest that this would be an unrealistic task, however. Regional clubs can use existing supra-national legal systems created within regions (e.g., EU emissions trading scheme), and the on-going UNFCCC negotiations have made some progress towards a global system of monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV).
In sum, the preceding discussion suggests that while climate clubs may be able to make an important, if limited, contribution to global climate policy, they are unlikely to do so by altering the incentives of reluctant global players.
Clubs will be at their most effective when they are constructed as coalitions of the willing, i.e. small groups of countries whose interests are closely aligned around a joint mitigation strategy. In such cases, climate clubs help the members to reduce the costs of emission reductions and encourage compliance. This can work in regional settings, for example in highly integrated regional organizations, such as the EU, or in looser networks of sub-national actors that link up their emissions trading schemes, as is the case in North America. 64 It is also possible that such clubs emerge among countries and other actors whose interests are aligned along sectoral lines (e.g., major shipping companies and nations). In both these cases, the rationalist theory of club cooperation offers some limited hope for an improved regime design as part of a multi-level and poly-centric governance system.
However, climate clubs are unlikely to be able to win over, let alone coerce, major emitters that are reluctant to join the global mitigation effort. In this sense, they are not a "new solution" 65 to the global climate problem.
International Legitimacy
A third rationale for climate minilateralism is centred on the notion of legitimacy and great power responsibility, and is based on constructivist and Analysts have also highlighted the risks of institutional fragmentation and loss of legitimacy if the centrality of UNFCCC multilateralism is diluted. 70 For constructivists and English School theorists, the legitimacy of the climate regime rests not solely in the broad acceptance it has gained, based on near-universal membership and consensus-based decision-making in a transparent process. It also, and critically, depends on the performance of the regime as a regulatory instrument. As Eckersley argues, "effectiveness is an important component of legitimacy," and the climate regime's failure to drive down emissions is therefore eroding its legitimacy as a workable international regime. 71 In this view, minilateralism offers an opportunity to strengthen output legitimacy, by giving great powers certain prerogatives that facilitate more effective bargaining and strengthen compliance. At the same time, such climate club initiatives would need to be linked to the regime's multilateral framework if a sufficient degree of input legitimacy is to be retained.
From its origins in the early 1990s, the UNFCCC regime favoured input over output legitimacy, deriving its legitimacy mainly from strong versions of procedural multilateralism and North-South equity. In the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, industrialised countries agreed to take on a larger mitigation burden based on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" Is such a construction likely to succeed? Can it adequately reflect power asymmetries and grant great power prerogatives while assuring the weaker members of the regime that they have not been reduced to bystanders in the climate negotiations? In other words, can the introduction of minilateralism into the UNFCCC regime increase its output legitimacy, by strengthening the buy-in from major emitters, while ensuring a sufficient degree of input legitimacy, particularly with regard to the representation of developing countries? We need to consider three key questions in this context.
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The first question concerns the promise of greater bargaining efficiency. In similar fashion to rationalists, the constructivist argument for climate minilateralism rests on the assumption that small-n bargaining can lead to faster and more effective results. Eckersley, for example, supports the idea of a critical mass approach that enables the core group of parties on the Council to reach an agreement first before the remaining UNFCCC parties are asked to endorse it. 75 However, the same problems that plague the rationalist case for small-n negotiations afflict constructivist arguments. Restricting bargaining to the major polluters cannot address the structural problem that is posed by interest diversity and disincentives to take costly mitigation action. If anything, making victims of global warming (mostly developing countries) members of the minilateral forum would merely reproduce the political faultlines that have bedeviled the UNFCCC's multilateral process. Clearly, the attempt to achieve a balanced representation in the Climate Council seeks to address input legitimacy concerns, but by reducing the exclusivity of the club it makes it even less likely that such small-n negotiations could break the deadlock in the bargaining process. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the conflict between input and output legitimacy cannot be entirely resolved.
If limits on performance-based legitimacy are the price to pay for enhancing representativeness and input legitimacy, then a second question arises: would the combined minilateral and multilateral architecture be legitimate in the eyes of the broader UNFCCC membership? Clearly, having a balanced representation of the main culprits and victims of climate change would ensure that developing country voices are at least heard inside the club. Whether they would also have veto power over any decisions taken by the club depends on its decision-making rules and whether its agreements need formal adoption by all parties to the UNFCCC. Past experience suggests that any deviation from consensus-based decision-making within the UNFCCC is highly controversial and will be resisted by developing countries.
The informal practice of using small-n gatherings in the climate negotiations, from the "Friends of the Chair" groups to the high-level meeting at the end of the Copenhagen Conference, has attracted strong criticism at critical junctures in the negotiations. Formalising such minilateral practices and making them more representative and transparent would certainly help address some of the concerns, but it is difficult to see how minilateral decisions could ever legitimately force the hand of the multilateral climate regime. 76 Again, we find that the inherent conflict between output and input legitimacy is a dilemma that refuses to go away even if climate minilateralism is formally integrated into the UNFCCC. 
Conclusions
Climate minilateralism has received growing scholarly attention in recent years, not least because it is now widely recognized that the multilateral climate regime has failed to stem the rise in global greenhouse gas emissions. This signals a decisive shift in the debate on how to deal with the global threat of climate change. It parallels similar developments in other global policy areas marked by multilateral gridlock, from international trade to financial regulation and nuclear non-proliferation. While scholars debate whether and how the UNFCCC regime can be reformed, a growing number are engaged in a search for alternative approaches to global climate governance. The realization is setting in that policy responses to global warming will have to be developed simultaneously at different levels of governance, from the local to the regional and global, and involving different types and configurations of actors. Within this debate, the idea of climate clubs has gained particular prominence as it promises to deal with several of multilateralism's main shortcomings: its cumbersome and slow bargaining process that gives veto power to too many players; its inability to create incentives for emission reductions and prevent free-riding; and its inability to acknowledge, and work with, the reality of power asymmetry that is at the heart of the global mitigation challenge. 
